On Efficient Aggregation of Distributed Energy Resources

TL;DR

This paper proposes an efficient aggregation model for distributed energy resources using a Stackelberg game, demonstrating that two-part pricing preserves market efficiency and avoiding welfare loss.

Contribution

It introduces a novel Stackelberg game model with two-part pricing for DER aggregation, ensuring social welfare matches direct market participation.

Findings

Market efficiency is preserved with the proposed model.

Two-part pricing is essential for efficiency.

One-part pricing leads to welfare loss.

Abstract

The rapid expansion of distributed energy resources (DERs) is one of the most significant changes to electricity systems around the world. Examples of DERs include solar panels, small natural gas-fueled generators, combined heat and power plants, etc. Due to the small supply capacities of these DERs, it is impractical for them to participate directly in the wholesale electricity market. We study in this paper an efficient aggregation model where a profit-maximizing aggregator procures electricity from DERs, and sells them in the wholesale market. The interaction between the aggregator and the DER owners is modeled as a Stackelberg game: the aggregator adopts two-part pricing by announcing a participation fee and a per-unit price of procurement for each DER owner, and the DER owner responds by choosing her payoff-maximizing energy supplies. We show that our proposed model preserves full market efficiency, i.e., the social welfare achieved by the aggregation model is the same as that when DERs participate directly in the wholesale market. We also note that two-part pricing is critical for market efficiency, and illustrate via an example that with one-part pricing, there will be an efficiency loss from DER aggregation, due to the profit-seeking behavior of the aggregator.