Taming Time-Varying Information Asymmetry in Fresh Status Acquisition
Zhiyuan Wang, Lin Gao, Jianwei Huang

TL;DR
This paper introduces a long-term decomposition mechanism for online status acquisition systems to balance social welfare and platform freshness amid time-varying private information.
Contribution
It proposes a novel LtD mechanism that decomposes multi-period status acquisition into distributed bidding problems, improving information asymmetry handling and platform performance.
Findings
Achieves a tunable trade-off between payoff and freshness.
Retains social performance comparable to symmetric information benchmarks.
Ensures long-term non-negative payoffs for PoIs.
Abstract
Many online platforms are providing valuable real-time contents (e.g., traffic) by continuously acquiring the status of different Points of Interest (PoIs). In status acquisition, it is challenging to determine how frequently a PoI should upload its status to a platform, since they are self-interested with private and possibly time-varying preferences. This paper considers a general multi-period status acquisition system, aiming to maximize the aggregate social welfare and ensure the platform freshness. The freshness is measured by a metric termed age of information. For this goal, we devise a long-term decomposition (LtD) mechanism to resolve the time-varying information asymmetry. The key idea is to construct a virtual social welfare that only depends on the current private information, and then decompose the per-period operation into multiple distributed bidding problems for the PoIs…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAge of Information Optimization · Congenital Heart Disease Studies · Cognitive Functions and Memory
