Learning in Markets: Greed Leads to Chaos but Following the Price is Right
Yun Kuen Cheung, Stefanos Leonardos, Georgios Piliouras

TL;DR
This paper compares learning dynamics in different market models, showing that gradient ascent can lead to chaos in some cases, while a proportional response protocol reliably converges to market equilibrium.
Contribution
It provides a formal proof of chaos in gradient ascent dynamics in Cournot competitions and introduces a convergent proportional response protocol for Fisher markets.
Findings
Gradient ascent can be Li-Yorke chaotic with small step sizes in Cournot models.
Proportional response protocol converges to market equilibrium in Fisher markets.
Chaos occurs even in simple two-firm, one-good settings.
Abstract
We study learning dynamics in distributed production economies such as blockchain mining, peer-to-peer file sharing and crowdsourcing. These economies can be modelled as multi-product Cournot competitions or all-pay auctions (Tullock contests) when individual firms have market power, or as Fisher markets with quasi-linear utilities when every firm has negligible influence on market outcomes. In the former case, we provide a formal proof that Gradient Ascent (GA) can be Li-Yorke chaotic for a step size as small as , where is the number of firms. In stark contrast, for the Fisher market case, we derive a Proportional Response (PR) protocol that converges to market equilibrium. The positive results on the convergence of the PR dynamics are obtained in full generality, in the sense that they hold for Fisher markets with \emph{any} quasi-linear utility functions. Conversely,…
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