Optimizing Fund Allocation for Game-based Verifiable Computation Outsourcing

TL;DR

This paper develops game-theoretic models to optimize fund allocation for verifiable computation outsourcing, balancing honesty, server wages, and verification delay in multi-client cloud scenarios.

Contribution

It introduces the first game-theoretic framework for optimal fund allocation in verifiable outsourcing with multiple clients and analyzes solutions through proofs and simulations.

Findings

Optimal fund allocation strategies ensure honest computation.

Maximized server wages while minimizing verification delay.

Validated solutions through extensive simulations.

Abstract

This paper considers the setting where a cloud server services a static set or a dynamic sequence of tasks submitted by multiple clients. Every client wishes to assure honest execution of tasks by additionally employing a trusted third party (TTP) to re-compute the tasks with a certain probability. The cloud server makes a deposit for each task it takes, each client allocates a budget (including the wage for the server and the cost for possibly hiring TTP) for each task submitted, and every party has its limited fund for either deposits or task budgets. We study how to allocate the funds optimally to achieve the three-fold goals: a rational cloud server honestly computes each task; the server's wage is maximized; the overall delay for task verification is minimized. We apply game theory to formulate the optimization problems, and develop the optimal or heuristic solutions for three application scenarios. For each of the solutions, we analyze it through either rigorous proofs or extensive simulations. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on optimizing fund allocation for verifiable outsourcing of computation in the setting of one server and multiple clients, based on game theory.