S3: Side-Channel Attack on Stylus Pencil through Sensors
Habiba Farrukh, Tinghan Yang, Hanwen Xu, Yuxuan Yin, He Wang, Z., Berkay Celik

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates a side-channel attack that infers what a user writes on an iPad using only motion sensor data, revealing potential privacy risks in smart device sensor access.
Contribution
The paper introduces S3, a novel system that leverages motion sensors and magnetic data to accurately identify user input on an iPad with an Apple Pencil, highlighting new security vulnerabilities.
Findings
Achieves over 93% accuracy in identifying letters and words
Uses a high-dimensional particle filter for tracking Pencil movements
Builds a magnetic map to correlate magnetic data with Pencil position
Abstract
With smart devices being an essential part of our everyday lives, unsupervised access to the mobile sensors' data can result in a multitude of side-channel attacks. In this paper, we study potential data leaks from Apple Pencil (2nd generation) supported by the Apple iPad Pro, the latest stylus pen which attaches to the iPad body magnetically for charging. We observe that the Pencil's body affects the magnetic readings sensed by the iPad's magnetometer when a user is using the Pencil. Therefore, we ask: Can we infer what a user is writing on the iPad screen with the Apple Pencil, given access to only the iPad's motion sensors' data? To answer this question, we present Side-channel attack on Stylus pencil through Sensors (S3), a system that identifies what a user is writing from motion sensor readings. We first use the sharp fluctuations in the motion sensors' data to determine when a…
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