Threat Actor Type Inference and Characterization within Cyber Threat Intelligence
Vasileios Mavroeidis, Ryan Hohimer, Tim Casey, Audun J{\o}sang

TL;DR
This paper introduces an ontological method for automatically inferring and characterizing threat actor types in cyber threat intelligence, enhancing contextual understanding and interoperability while reducing manual bias.
Contribution
It presents a novel ontological framework that leverages controlled vocabularies to infer threat actor types and behaviors, improving automation and contextual richness in cyber threat intelligence.
Findings
Enables structured sharing of threat actor information
Automates inference of threat actor types at machine speed
Reduces cognitive biases in threat classification
Abstract
As the cyber threat landscape is constantly becoming increasingly complex and polymorphic, the more critical it becomes to understand the enemy and its modus operandi for anticipatory threat reduction. Even though the cyber security community has developed a certain maturity in describing and sharing technical indicators for informing defense components, we still struggle with non-uniform, unstructured, and ambiguous higher-level information, such as the threat actor context, thereby limiting our ability to correlate with different sources to derive more contextual, accurate, and relevant intelligence. We see the need to overcome this limitation in order to increase our ability to produce and better operationalize cyber threat intelligence. Our research demonstrates how commonly agreed upon controlled vocabularies for characterizing threat actors and their operations can be used to…
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