Conceptualising Contestability: Perspectives on Contesting Algorithmic Decisions
Henrietta Lyons, Eduardo Velloso, Tim Miller

TL;DR
This paper explores the concept of contestability in algorithmic decision-making, analyzing stakeholder perspectives on its definition, importance, and implications within the context of Australia's AI Ethics Framework.
Contribution
It provides an analysis of diverse perspectives on contestability from submissions to Australia's AI Ethics Framework, highlighting its conceptual ambiguities and ethical significance.
Findings
Contestability is viewed as a safeguard for individuals.
There is disagreement on what contestability precisely entails.
It is comparable to contestability in human decision-making.
Abstract
As the use of algorithmic systems in high-stakes decision-making increases, the ability to contest algorithmic decisions is being recognised as an important safeguard for individuals. Yet, there is little guidance on what `contestability'--the ability to contest decisions--in relation to algorithmic decision-making requires. Recent research presents different conceptualisations of contestability in algorithmic decision-making. We contribute to this growing body of work by describing and analysing the perspectives of people and organisations who made submissions in response to Australia's proposed `AI Ethics Framework', the first framework of its kind to include `contestability' as a core ethical principle. Our findings reveal that while the nature of contestability is disputed, it is seen as a way to protect individuals, and it resembles contestability in relation to human…
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