Information Design in Multi-stage Games
Miltiadis Makris, Ludovic Renou
TL;DR
This paper extends the concept of Bayes correlated equilibrium to multi-stage games, providing a new framework for analyzing strategic interactions over multiple stages.
Contribution
It introduces a generalized characterization of Bayes correlated equilibrium for multi-stage games, expanding the theoretical understanding of dynamic strategic behavior.
Findings
New characterization results for multi-stage Bayes correlated equilibrium
Application to illustrative examples demonstrating the framework's usefulness
Enhanced understanding of strategic behavior in multi-stage settings
Abstract
This paper generalizes the concept of Bayes correlated equilibrium (Bergemann and Morris, 2016) to multi-stage games. We demonstrate the power of our characterization results by applying them to a number of illustrative examples and applications.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Auction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems