Poacher-population dynamics when legal trade of naturally deceased organisms funds anti-poaching enforcement
Matthew H. Holden, Jakeb Lockyer

TL;DR
This paper models how legal wildlife trade, funded by naturally deceased organisms, can potentially sustain or threaten species populations, emphasizing the importance of revenue allocation towards anti-poaching efforts.
Contribution
It introduces a dynamic model analyzing poacher-population interactions under legal trade, identifying critical thresholds for sustainable wildlife populations.
Findings
High revenue allocation towards anti-poaching is crucial for population sustainability.
Legal trade can lead to extinction if insufficient funds are directed to conservation.
The model provides a framework for managing wildlife trade and conservation funding.
Abstract
Can a regulated, legal market for wildlife products protect species threatened by poaching? It is one of the most controversial ideas in biodiversity conservation. Perhaps the most convincing reason for legalizing wildlife trade is that trade revenue could fund the protection and conservation of poached species. In this paper, we examine the possible poacher-population dynamic consequences of legal trade funding conservation. The model consists of a manager scavenging carcasses for wildlife products, who then sells the products, and directs a portion of the revenue towards funding anti-poaching law enforcement. Through a global analysis of the model, we derive the critical proportion of product the manager must scavenge, and the critical proportion of trade revenue the manager must allocate towards increased enforcement, in order for legal trade to lead to abundant long-term wildlife…
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