Stackelberg-Pareto Synthesis (Full Version)
V\'eronique Bruy\`ere, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois Raskin, Cl\'ement Tamines

TL;DR
This paper explores a new class of Stackelberg games with multiple objectives for Player 1, analyzing the computational complexity of synthesizing Player 0's strategies to ensure objectives are met despite rational responses.
Contribution
It introduces the Stackelberg-Pareto Synthesis problem with multiple objectives and characterizes its complexity for different game types, including fixed-parameter tractability and NEXPTIME-completeness.
Findings
The problem is fixed-parameter tractable for parity or reachability objectives.
The problem is NEXPTIME-complete for these objectives.
The problem is NP-complete for reachability objectives on trees.
Abstract
In this paper, we study the framework of two-player Stackelberg games played on graphs in which Player 0 announces a strategy and Player 1 responds rationally with a strategy that is an optimal response. While it is usually assumed that Player 1 has a single objective, we consider here the new setting where he has several. In this context, after responding with his strategy, Player 1 gets a payoff in the form of a vector of Booleans corresponding to his satisfied objectives. Rationality of Player 1 is encoded by the fact that his response must produce a Pareto-optimal payoff given the strategy of Player 0. We study the Stackelberg-Pareto Synthesis problem which asks whether Player 0 can announce a strategy which satisfies his objective, whatever the rational response of Player 1. For games in which objectives are either all parity or all reachability objectives, we show that this…
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