Domain Name Encryption Is Not Enough: Privacy Leakage via IP-based Website Fingerprinting
Nguyen Phong Hoang, Arian Akhavan Niaki, Phillipa Gill, Michalis, Polychronakis

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates that IP address-based website fingerprinting can effectively identify visited websites despite domain encryption, posing significant privacy risks and highlighting the need for additional countermeasures.
Contribution
It introduces a novel IP-based website fingerprinting technique that achieves high accuracy in identifying websites, even with domain encryption technologies in place.
Findings
84% accuracy on 200K websites
92% accuracy on popular websites
70% accuracy after two months over time
Abstract
Although the security benefits of domain name encryption technologies such as DNS over TLS (DoT), DNS over HTTPS (DoH), and Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) are clear, their positive impact on user privacy is weakened by--the still exposed--IP address information. However, content delivery networks, DNS-based load balancing, co-hosting of different websites on the same server, and IP address churn, all contribute towards making domain-IP mappings unstable, and prevent straightforward IP-based browsing tracking. In this paper, we show that this instability is not a roadblock (assuming a universal DoT/DoH and ECH deployment), by introducing an IP-based website fingerprinting technique that allows a network-level observer to identify at scale the website a user visits. Our technique exploits the complex structure of most websites, which load resources from several domains besides their…
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