Free agency and determinism: is there a sensible definition of computational sourcehood?
Marius Krumm, Markus P. Mueller

TL;DR
This paper explores a refined concept of computational irreducibility called computational sourcehood, aiming to formalize how certain processes inherently contain their own source of actions, impacting free agency and determinism debates.
Contribution
It introduces a formal analysis of computational sourcehood, linking it to simulation preorders on Turing machines and identifying key structural challenges in defining it.
Findings
Analysis of the relation between sourcehood and simulation preorders
Identification of structural obstacles to formalizing sourcehood
Highlighting the importance of structure-preserving functions in simulation
Abstract
Can free agency be compatible with determinism? Compatibilists argue that the answer is yes, and it has been suggested that the computer science principle of "computational irreducibility" sheds light on this compatibility. It implies that there cannot in general be shortcuts to predict the behavior of agents, explaining why deterministic agents often appear to act freely. In this paper, we introduce a variant of computational irreducibility that intends to capture more accurately aspects of actual (as opposed to apparent) free agency: computational sourcehood, i.e. the phenomenon that the successful prediction of a process' behavior must typically involve an almost-exact representation of the relevant features of that process, regardless of the time it takes to arrive at the prediction. We argue that this can be understood as saying that the process itself is the source of its actions,…
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Taxonomy
TopicsComputability, Logic, AI Algorithms · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
