A Two-Functional-Network Framework of Opinion Dynamics
Wentao Zhang, Zhiqiang Zuo, and Yijing Wang

TL;DR
This paper introduces a two-network model for opinion dynamics, combining an interacting network with an appraisal network to better understand how opinions form, cluster, or reach consensus amid complex social influences.
Contribution
It proposes a novel framework integrating interacting and appraisal networks, revealing how appraisal types influence opinion consensus and clustering, with extensions to interdependent issues.
Findings
Cooperative appraisal networks lead to opinion consensus.
Antagonistic appraisal networks cause opinion clustering.
Additional restrictions can ensure consensus even with antagonistic appraisal.
Abstract
A common trait involving the opinion dynamics in social networks is an anchor on interacting network to characterize the opinion formation process among participating social actors, such as information flow, cooperative and antagonistic influence, etc. Nevertheless, interacting networks are generally public for social groups, as well as other individuals who may be interested in. This blocks a more precise interpretation of the opinion formation process since social actors always have complex feeling, motivation and behavior, even beliefs that are personally private. In this paper, we formulate a general configuration on describing how individual's opinion evolves in a distinct fashion. It consists of two functional networks: interacting network and appraisal network. Interacting network inherits the operational properties as DeGroot iterative opinion pooling scheme while appraisal…
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Taxonomy
TopicsOpinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Complex Network Analysis Techniques · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
