Modeling the interplay between seasonal flu outcomes and individual vaccination decisions
Irena Papst, Kevin P. O'Keeffe, Steven H. Strogatz

TL;DR
This paper introduces a new model of seasonal flu vaccination decisions that incorporates social psychology insights, revealing complex population behaviors like biennial oscillations around herd immunity thresholds.
Contribution
It develops a coupled disease and vaccination model based on experimental social psychology data, improving realism over traditional rational choice assumptions.
Findings
Model reproduces known epidemiological results.
Identifies conditions for herd immunity self-organization.
Discovers biennial oscillations in vaccination coverage.
Abstract
Seasonal influenza presents an ongoing challenge to public health. The rapid evolution of the flu virus necessitates annual vaccination campaigns, but the decision to get vaccinated or not in a given year is largely voluntary, at least in the United States, and many people decide against it. In early attempts to model these yearly flu vaccine decisions, it was often assumed that individuals behave rationally, and do so with perfect information -- assumptions that allowed the techniques of classical economics and game theory to be applied. However, the usual assumptions are contradicted by the emerging empirical evidence about human decision-making behavior in this context. We develop a simple model of coupled disease spread and vaccination dynamics that instead incorporates experimental observations from social psychology to model annual vaccine decision-making more realistically. We…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
