Zero-error attack against coherent-one-way quantum key distribution

TL;DR

This paper introduces a highly effective zero-error attack on coherent-one-way quantum key distribution, significantly limiting its secure transmission distance and revealing vulnerabilities in its practical security assumptions.

Contribution

The authors develop an essentially optimal zero-error attack against COW-QKD, establishing a tighter upper bound on its secret key rate and maximum secure distance.

Findings

The attack reduces the secret key rate by over an order of magnitude compared to previous bounds.

It sets a new upper limit on the secure transmission distance of COW-QKD.

The attack demonstrates fundamental security vulnerabilities in the scheme.

Abstract

Coherent-one-way (COW) quantum key distribution (QKD) held the promise of distributing secret keys over long distances with a simple experimental setup. Indeed, this scheme is currently used in commercial applications. Surprisingly, however, it has been recently shown that its secret key rate scales at most quadratically with the system's transmittance and, thus, it is not appropriate for long distance QKD transmission. Such pessimistic result was derived by employing a so-called zero-error attack, in which the eavesdropper does not introduce any error, but still the legitimate users of the system cannot distill a secure key. Here, we present a zero-error attack against COW-QKD that is essentially optimal, in the sense that no other attack can restrict further its maximum achievable distance in the absence of errors. This translates into an upper bound on its secret key rate that is more than an order of magnitude lower than previously known upper bounds.