Counter-terrorism analysis using cooperative game theory

TL;DR

This paper explores counter-terrorism strategies through cooperative game theory, emphasizing the importance of communication and binding agreements among countries to effectively combat terrorism.

Contribution

It introduces a cooperative game theory framework for counter-terrorism, contrasting with previous non-cooperative approaches and highlighting the role of communication and alliances.

Findings

Cooperative strategies can enhance counter-terrorism efforts.

Countries' economic and political ties facilitate cooperation.

Binding agreements improve collective security.

Abstract

Game theory has been applied in many fields of study, especially economics and political science. Arce M. and Sandler (2005) analyzed counter-terrorism using non-cooperative game theory (the players are, for example, the US and the EU), which assumes that communication among the players is not allowed, or, if it is allowed, then there is no mechanism to enforce any agreement the players may make. The only solution in the non-cooperative setting would be a Nash equilibrium because the players adopt only self-enforcing strategies. Here we analyze counter-terrorism using cooperative game theory, because there are ways to communicate among the players and to make binding agreements; indeed, countries that oppose terrorism are closely connected to each other in many aspects such as economically and in terms of international politics.