The Empirical Under-determination Argument Against Scientific Realism for Dual Theories

TL;DR

This paper examines how dualities in physics lead to empirical under-determination and argues that such under-determination does not threaten scientific realism, offering a nuanced perspective on the debate.

Contribution

It clarifies the nature of empirical under-determination caused by dualities and proposes a refined approach to scientific realism that accounts for these dualities.

Findings

Dualities can lead to empirical under-determination in physics.

The under-determination from dualities is benign and not a threat to realism.

A method to reduce interpretative options regarding dualities is proposed.

Abstract

This paper explores the options available to the anti-realist to defend a Quinean empirical under-determination thesis using examples of dualities. I first explicate a version of the empirical under-determination thesis that can be brought to bear on theories of contemporary physics. Then I identify a class of examples of dualities that lead to empirical under-determination. But I argue that the resulting under-determination is benign, and is not a threat to a cautious scientific realism. Thus dualities are not new ammunition for the anti-realist. The paper also shows how the number of possible interpretative options about dualities that have been considered in the literature can be reduced, and suggests a general approach to scientific realism that one may take dualities to favour.