A pessimist's approach to one-sided matching
Tom Demeulemeester, Dries Goossens, Ben Hermans, Roel Leus

TL;DR
This paper investigates decomposing probabilistic matchings into efficient deterministic matchings, ensuring fairness and strategy-proofness, with algorithms and bounds for specific mechanisms, supported by real-world data evaluations.
Contribution
It introduces a polynomial-time algorithm for decomposing certain probabilistic assignments into Pareto-efficient matchings, maximizing assigned agents, and analyzes bounds for other mechanisms.
Findings
Polynomial-time algorithm for Probabilistic Serial mechanism decomposition
Decomposition guarantees at least the expected number of assigned agents
Random Serial Dictatorship assigns at least half of the optimal agents
Abstract
Inspired by real-world applications such as the assignment of pupils to schools or the allocation of social housing, the one-sided matching problem studies how a set of agents can be assigned to a set of objects when the agents have preferences over the objects, but not vice versa. For fairness reasons, most mechanisms use randomness, and therefore result in a probabilistic assignment. We study the problem of decomposing these probabilistic assignments into a weighted sum of ex-post (Pareto-)efficient matchings, while maximizing the worst-case number of assigned agents. This decomposition preserves all the assignments' desirable properties, most notably strategy-proofness. For a specific class of probabilistic assignments, including the assignment by the Probabilistic Serial mechanism, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm for this problem that obtains a decomposition in which all…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Auction Theory and Applications · Smart Parking Systems Research
