PHOENIX: Device-Centric Cellular Network Protocol Monitoring using Runtime Verification
Mitziu Echeverria, Zeeshan Ahmed, Bincheng Wang, M. Fareed Arif, Syed, Rafiul Hussain, Omar Chowdhury

TL;DR
Phoenix is a device-centric runtime verification system that detects cellular network vulnerabilities and unsafe practices in real-time, offering customizable defenses and attack detection with high speed and low energy overhead.
Contribution
The paper introduces Phoenix, a novel extendable runtime verification framework for identifying cellular network vulnerabilities from the device perspective, including automatic signature synthesis.
Findings
Identified all 15 n-day vulnerabilities in 4G LTE networks.
Achieved high packet processing speed (~68000 packets/sec).
Maintained low energy overhead (~4mW).
Abstract
End-user-devices in the current cellular ecosystem are prone to many different vulnerabilities across different generations and protocol layers. Fixing these vulnerabilities retrospectively can be expensive, challenging, or just infeasible. A pragmatic approach for dealing with such a diverse set of vulnerabilities would be to identify attack attempts at runtime on the device side, and thwart them with mitigating and corrective actions. Towards this goal, in the paper we propose a general and extendable approach called Phoenix for identifying n-day cellular network control-plane vulnerabilities as well as dangerous practices of network operators from the device vantage point. Phoenix monitors the device-side cellular network traffic for performing signature-based unexpected behavior detection through lightweight runtime verification techniques. Signatures in Phoenix can be…
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