A General Counterexample to Any Decision Theory and Some Responses
Joar Skalse

TL;DR
The paper introduces a universal counterexample challenging all decision theories, along with potential responses that question the criteria for decision problem equivalence and their implications for existing decision theory debates.
Contribution
It presents a general schema to construct problems that outperform any decision theory, highlighting fundamental limitations in formulating universally optimal decision frameworks.
Findings
A universal counterexample to all decision theories.
Responses that redefine decision problem equivalence.
Implications for existing decision theory debates.
Abstract
In this paper I present an argument and a general schema which can be used to construct a problem case for any decision theory, in a way that could be taken to show that one cannot formulate a decision theory that is never outperformed by any other decision theory. I also present and discuss a number of possible responses to this argument. One of these responses raises the question of what it means for two decision problems to be "equivalent" in the relevant sense, and gives an answer to this question which would invalidate the first argument. However, this position would have further consequences for how we compare different decision theories in decision problems already discussed in the literature (including e.g. Newcomb's problem).
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
