Cap the Gap: Solving the Egoistic Dilemma under the Transaction Fee-Incentive Bitcoin
Hongwei Shi, Shengling Wang, Qin Hu, Xiuzhen Cheng, and Jianhui Huang

TL;DR
This paper examines the shift in Bitcoin's incentive structure from subsidies to transaction fees, analyzing its implications for miner behavior and network security.
Contribution
It introduces a novel approach to addressing the egoistic dilemma in Bitcoin's fee-based incentive model, proposing solutions to ensure network stability.
Findings
Transaction fee incentives influence miner strategies.
The proposed method enhances network security under fee-based incentives.
Insights into the transition impact on Bitcoin's economic model.
Abstract
Bitcoin has witnessed a prevailing transition that employing transaction fees paid by users rather than subsidy assigned by the system as the main incentive for mining.
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Taxonomy
TopicsBlockchain Technology Applications and Security · Digital Platforms and Economics · FinTech, Crowdfunding, Digital Finance
