
TL;DR
The paper critically examines the analogy between life and information, arguing that if the analogy is invalid, then claims about artificial minds advancing life's evolution are also unfounded, and discusses implications for reductionism.
Contribution
It challenges the validity of the analogy between life and information used to justify artificial minds as evolutionary progress, emphasizing non-reductionist views of biology and chemistry.
Findings
The analogy between life and information is similar to the design argument.
If the design argument is invalid, so is the analogy-based claim about artificial minds.
Biology and chemistry are not reductionist, contrary to the analogy's implications.
Abstract
I'll show that the kind of analogy between life and information [argue for by authors such as Davies (2000), Walker and Davies (2013), Dyson (1979), Gleick (2011), Kurzweil (2012), Ward (2009)], that seems to be central to the effect that artificial mind may represents an expected advance in the life evolution in Universe, is like the design argument and that if the design argument is unfounded and invalid, the argument to the effect that artificial mind may represents an expected advance in the life evolution in Universe is also unfounded and invalid. However, if we are prepared to admit (though we should not do) this method of reasoning as valid, I'll show that the analogy between life and information to the effect that artificial mind may represents an expected advance in the life evolution in Universe seems suggest some type of reductionism of life to information, but biology…
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