Negative votes to depolarize politics
Karthik H. Shankar

TL;DR
This paper proposes a new voting scheme that explicitly incorporates negative preferences to reduce political polarization and promote more representative and less divisive elections.
Contribution
It introduces a novel voting method that captures both candidate popularity and polarization, addressing limitations of existing ranked-choice systems.
Findings
The proposed scheme effectively identifies less polarizing candidates.
It encourages candidates to adopt less divisive campaign strategies.
The method balances popularity with minimal polarization.
Abstract
The controversies around the 2020 US presidential elections certainly casts serious concerns on the efficiency of the current voting system in representing the people's will. Is the naive Plurality voting suitable in an extremely polarized political environment? Alternate voting schemes are gradually gaining public support, wherein the voters rank their choices instead of just voting for their first preference. However they do not capture certain crucial aspects of voter preferences like disapprovals and negativities against candidates. I argue that these unexpressed negativities are the predominant source of polarization in politics. I propose a voting scheme with an explicit expression of these negative preferences, so that we can simultaneously decipher the popularity as well as the polarity of each candidate. The winner is picked by an optimal tradeoff between the most popular and…
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Taxonomy
TopicsElectoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems
