Concrete Evaluation of the Random Probing Security

TL;DR

This paper introduces a new metric called Secret Recovery Probability (SRP) to evaluate the security of masked implementations against random probing attacks, providing a systematic way to quantify information leakage about secrets.

Contribution

It proposes the SRP metric and a method to analyze the relation between internal variables and secrets through parity equations, advancing security assessment techniques.

Findings

SRP effectively quantifies leakage in masked implementations

The approach links probing relations to parity systems for analysis

Provides a new framework for evaluating probing security

Abstract

We study masked implementation's security when an adversary randomly probes each of its internal variables, intending to recover non-trivial knowledge about its secrets. We introduce a novel metric called Secret Recovery Probability (SRP) for assessing the informativeness of the probing leakages about the masked secrets. To evaluate SRP, our starting point is to describe the relations of the intermediate variables with a parity equation system where the target secret is an unknown of this system ...