Game-theoretic Models of Moral and Other-Regarding Agents

TL;DR

This paper explores Kantian equilibria in finite normal form games, highlighting their computational and extension challenges, and proposes alternative, more tractable models of morally motivated decision-making.

Contribution

It identifies problems with Kantian equilibria and introduces new, computationally feasible models that interpolate between self-regarding and other-regarding behaviors.

Findings

Kantian equilibria are computationally intractable.

Extension to general games is problematic.

Proposed models are more tractable and morally motivated.

Abstract

We investigate Kantian equilibria in finite normal form games, a class of non-Nashian, morally motivated courses of action that was recently proposed in the economics literature. We highlight a number of problems with such equilibria, including computational intractability, a high price of miscoordination, and expensive/problematic extension to general normal form games. We point out that such a proper generalization will likely involve the concept of program equilibrium. Finally we propose some general, intuitive, computationally tractable, other-regarding equilibria related to Kantian equilibria, as well as a class of courses of action that interpolates between purely self-regarding and Kantian behavior.