ARMAND: Anti-Repackaging through Multi-pattern Anti-tampering based on Native Detection
Alessio Merlo, Antonio Ruggia, Luigi Sciolla, Luca Verderame

TL;DR
ARMAND is a novel anti-repackaging scheme for Android apps that uses multiple protection patterns and native code to effectively detect tampering and resist common attack methods, demonstrated on a large dataset.
Contribution
The paper introduces ARMAND, a new anti-repackaging scheme that overcomes limitations of existing methods by employing multi-pattern protections and native code, implemented in ARMANDroid.
Findings
Robust against common attack vectors
Efficient in time and space overhead
Effective on 30,000 real-world Android apps
Abstract
App repackaging refers to the practice of customizing an existing mobile app and redistributing it in the wild to fool the final user into installing the repackaged app instead of the original one. In this way, an attacker can embed malicious payload into a legitimate app for different aims, such as access to premium features, redirect revenue, or access to user's private data. In the Android ecosystem, apps are available on public stores, and the only requirement for an app to execute properly is to be digitally signed. Due to this, the repackaging threat is widely spread. Anti-repackaging techniques aim to make harder the repackaging process for an attack adding logical controls - called detection node - in the app at compile-time. Such controls check the app integrity at runtime to detect tampering. If tampering is recognized, the detection nodes lead the repackaged app to fail…
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