Tit-for-Tat Strategy as a Deformed Zero-Determinant Strategy in Repeated Games

TL;DR

This paper introduces deformed zero-determinant strategies in repeated games and demonstrates that the Tit-for-Tat strategy functions as such, unilaterally controlling payoff distributions in the prisoner's dilemma.

Contribution

It reveals that Tit-for-Tat is a deformed zero-determinant strategy, expanding understanding of strategic control in repeated games.

Findings

Tit-for-Tat unilaterally equalizes payoff distributions.

Deformed zero-determinant strategies generalize previous concepts.

Tit-for-Tat acts as a control mechanism in repeated prisoner's dilemma.

Abstract

We introduce the concept of deformed zero-determinant strategies in repeated games. We then show that the Tit-for-Tat strategy in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game is a deformed zero-determinant strategy, which unilaterally equalizes the probability distribution functions of payoffs of two players.