CrypTag: Thwarting Physical and Logical Memory Vulnerabilities using Cryptographically Colored Memory
Pascal Nasahl, Robert Schilling, Mario Werner, Jan Hoogerbrugge,, Marcel Medwed, Stefan Mangard

TL;DR
CrypTag is a hardware/software co-design that combines memory encryption with memory coloring to efficiently prevent logical and physical memory vulnerabilities without significant overhead.
Contribution
It introduces CrypTag, a novel approach embedding memory colors in pointers and leveraging encryption to ensure comprehensive memory safety with minimal performance impact.
Findings
Achieves full physical and logical memory safety with low overhead.
Integrates memory coloring into encryption, avoiding extra tag storage.
Provides a compiler extension for automatic vulnerability detection.
Abstract
Memory vulnerabilities are a major threat to many computing systems. To effectively thwart spatial and temporal memory vulnerabilities, full logical memory safety is required. However, current mitigation techniques for memory safety are either too expensive or trade security against efficiency. One promising attempt to detect memory safety vulnerabilities in hardware is memory coloring, a security policy deployed on top of tagged memory architectures. However, due to the memory storage and bandwidth overhead of large tags, commodity tagged memory architectures usually only provide small tag sizes, thus limiting their use for security applications. Irrespective of logical memory safety, physical memory safety is a necessity in hostile environments prevalent for modern cloud computing and IoT devices. Architectures from Intel and AMD already implement transparent memory encryption to…
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