Out-of-Equilibrium Dynamics and Excess Volatility in Firm Networks
Th\'eo Dessertaine, Jos\'e Moran, Michael Benzaquen, Jean-Philippe, Bouchaud

TL;DR
This paper investigates how firm networks' dynamics can lead to excess volatility and complex behaviors like chaos, especially near instability points, offering insights into endogenous business cycle phenomena.
Contribution
It introduces a minimal dynamical model of firm networks that explains excess volatility and complex dynamics as endogenous phenomena near instability thresholds.
Findings
Convergence to equilibrium diverges near instability points.
Spontaneous periodic and chaotic dynamics emerge outside equilibrium regions.
Diminishing returns and perishability ease convergence to equilibrium.
Abstract
We study the conditions under which input-output networks can dynamically attain a competitive equilibrium, where markets clear and profits are zero. We endow a classical firm network model with minimal dynamical rules that reduce supply/demand imbalances and excess profits. We show that the time needed to reach equilibrium diverges to infinity as the system approaches an instability point beyond which the Hawkins-Simons condition is violated and competitive equilibrium is no longer admissible. We argue that such slow dynamics is a source of excess volatility, through accumulation and amplification of exogenous shocks. Factoring in essential physical constraints absent in our minimal model, such as causality or inventory management, we then propose a dynamically consistent model that displays a rich variety of phenomena. Competitive equilibrium can only be reached after some time and…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEconomic theories and models · Complex Systems and Time Series Analysis · Game Theory and Applications
