The Counterfactual NESS Definition of Causation

TL;DR

This paper introduces a new causation definition that combines Wright's NESS approach with counterfactual reasoning, addressing preemption issues and providing a systematic framework for causation analysis.

Contribution

It formalizes a causation definition integrating NESS and counterfactual principles, and improves it to handle preemption cases effectively.

Findings

Formalizes NESS with counterfactual difference-making

Weakens the difference-making condition to handle preemption

Provides a systematic causation analysis framework

Abstract

In previous work with Joost Vennekens I proposed a definition of actual causation that is based on certain plausible principles, thereby allowing the debate on causation to shift away from its heavy focus on examples towards a more systematic analysis. This paper contributes to that analysis in two ways. First, I show that our definition is in fact a formalization of Wright's famous NESS definition of causation combined with a counterfactual difference-making condition. This means that our definition integrates two highly influential approaches to causation that are claimed to stand in opposition to each other. Second, I modify our definition to offer a substantial improvement: I weaken the difference-making condition in such a way that it avoids the problematic analysis of cases of preemption. The resulting Counterfactual NESS definition of causation forms a natural compromise between counterfactual approaches and the NESS approach.