Pricing Security in Proof-of-Work Systems
George Bissias, Rainer B\"ohme, David Thibodeau, Brian N. Levine

TL;DR
This paper characterizes the security investment of miners in proof-of-work blockchains in terms of fiat costs, establishing a unique equilibrium influenced by market prices, supported by analytical models and empirical blockchain data.
Contribution
It introduces a market-price-based equilibrium model for PoW security allocation and validates it with extensive empirical blockchain data analysis.
Findings
Market prices predict security allocation with less than 0.6% error between Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash.
Market prices predict security allocation with 0.45% error between Bitcoin and Litecoin.
Change in market prices Granger-causes change in security allocation.
Abstract
A key component of security in decentralized blockchains is proof of opportunity cost among block producers. In the case of proof-of-work (PoW), currently used by the most prominent systems, the cost is due to spent computation. In this paper, we characterize the security investment of miners in terms of its cost in fiat money. This enables comparison of security allocations across PoW blockchains that generally use different PoW algorithms and reward miners in different cryptocurrency units. We prove that there exists a unique allocation equilibrium, depending on market prices only, that is achieved by both strategic miners (who contemplate the actions of others) and by miners seeking only short-term profit. In fact, the latter will unknowingly compensate for any attempt to deliberately shift security allocation away from equilibrium. Our conclusions are supported analytically…
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Taxonomy
TopicsBlockchain Technology Applications and Security · Digital Platforms and Economics · Traffic control and management
