Realism and metaphysics in quantum mechanics
Raoni Wohnrath Arroyo, Jonas R. B. Arenhart

TL;DR
This paper examines the ontological and metaphysical implications of scientific realism in quantum mechanics, highlighting challenges in justifying entities and structures, and proposing a meta-Popperian approach to evaluate metaphysical options.
Contribution
It analyzes the ontological and metaphysical issues faced by scientific realism in quantum mechanics and introduces a meta-Popperian method to assess metaphysical alternatives.
Findings
Epistemic limitations hinder belief in quantum entities
Multiple metaphysical theories can describe quantum entities
Meta-Popperian method helps eliminate incompatible metaphysical options
Abstract
According to scientific realism, science gives us an approximately true description of what the world is like. But what does it mean? In this chapter, we focus on the ontological and metaphysical aspects of this discussion. That is, we are concerned with the following questions: what there is, according to our best scientific theories? And how are these things that theories say exist? We start from the assumption that a genuine scientific realism must deal with these issues. Taking non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study, we discuss some of the challenges currently faced by a genuinely realistic stance. We argue, first, that in the ontological aspect, realists are in the same boat as science, that is, without sufficient epistemic justification to adopt the belief in the entities postulated by a single quantum theory, given that experience (currently) is not able to decide…
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Taxonomy
TopicsPhilosophy and History of Science · Quantum Mechanics and Applications
