Defending against Contagious Attacks on a Network with Resource Reallocation
Rufan Bai, Haoxing Lin, Xinyu Yang, Xiaowei Wu, Minming Li, Weijia Jia

TL;DR
This paper studies a network defense model against contagious attacks, considering resource reallocation constraints, and provides computational complexity results, an optimization formulation, and an approximation algorithm with positive experimental outcomes.
Contribution
It introduces a novel resource reallocation model for contagious attacks, analyzes its computational hardness, and offers practical algorithms with proven effectiveness.
Findings
Computing optimal reallocation is NP-hard.
Optimal resource allocation without reallocation is NP-hard.
Proposed algorithms perform well in minimizing damage.
Abstract
In classic network security games, the defender distributes defending resources to the nodes of the network, and the attacker attacks a node, with the objective to maximize the damage caused. Existing models assume that the attack at node u causes damage only at u. However, in many real-world security scenarios, the attack at a node u spreads to the neighbors of u and can cause damage at multiple nodes, e.g., for the outbreak of a virus. In this paper, we consider the network defending problem against contagious attacks. Existing works that study shared resources assume that the resource allocated to a node can be shared or duplicated between neighboring nodes. However, in real world, sharing resource naturally leads to a decrease in defending power of the source node, especially when defending against contagious attacks. To this end, we study the model in which resources allocated to…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
Taxonomy
TopicsInfrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis · Game Theory and Applications · Network Security and Intrusion Detection
