Some game theoretic marketing attribution models

TL;DR

This paper introduces two game theoretic models for marketing attribution, extending existing models to account for channel order and repetition, and analyzing bankruptcy-based attribution mechanisms.

Contribution

It proposes novel extensions of cooperative TU games and bankruptcy problems for marketing attribution, incorporating channel order, repetition, and new attribution rules.

Findings

Shapley value effectively allocates credit in extended Sum Games.

Bankruptcy problem approach offers alternative attribution mechanisms.

Analysis shows the relevance of constrained rules in bankruptcy-based attribution.

Abstract

In this paper, we propose and analyse two game theoretical models useful to design marketing channels attribution mechanisms based on cooperative TU games and bankruptcy problems, respectively. First, we analyse the Sum Game, a coalitional game introduced by Morales (2016). We extend the ideas introduced in Zhao et al. (2018) and Cano-Berlanga et al. (2017) to the case in which the order and the repetition of channels on the paths to conversion are taken into account. In all studied cases, the Shapley value is proposed as the attribution mechanism. Second, a bankruptcy problem approach is proposed, and a similar analysis is developed relying on the Constrained Equal Loss (CEL) and Proportional (PROP) rules as attribution mechanisms. In particular, it is relevant to note that the class of attribution bankruptcy problems is a proper subclass of bankruptcy problems.