A Closer Look at the Tropical Cryptography
Steve Isaac, Delaram Kahrobaei

TL;DR
This paper critically analyzes two recent tropical algebra-based public key exchange protocols, revealing a fast attack on one and implementation issues in the other, thereby questioning their security and practicality.
Contribution
It introduces a fast attack on the first protocol and demonstrates the second protocol's implementation flaws, providing new insights into tropical cryptography security.
Findings
Fast attack successfully compromises the first protocol
Second protocol cannot be properly implemented as described
Highlights vulnerabilities in tropical algebra-based cryptography
Abstract
We examine two public key exchange protocols proposed recently by Grigoriev and Shpilrain (arXiv:1811.06386), which use tropical algebra. We introduce a fast attack on the first protocol, and we show that the second protocol cannot be implemented as described.
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