Approximate Nash equilibria in large nonconvex aggregative games
Kang Liu, Nadia Oudjane, Cheng Wan

TL;DR
This paper establishes the existence of approximate Nash equilibria in large nonconvex sum-aggregative games with nonconvex costs, and proposes a gradient-proximal algorithm to compute such equilibria efficiently, with applications to electricity demand management.
Contribution
It proves the existence of approximate equilibria in nonconvex aggregative games and introduces a gradient-proximal algorithm for their computation.
Findings
Existence of $rac{1}{n^ ext{gamma}}$-Nash equilibria in large games.
A gradient-proximal algorithm computes $rac{1}{n}$-Nash equilibria efficiently.
Application to demand-side management in electricity systems.
Abstract
This paper shows the existence of -Nash equilibria in -player noncooperative sum-aggregative games in which the players' cost functions, depending only on their own action and the average of all players' actions, are lower semicontinuous in the former while -H\"{o}lder continuous in the latter. Neither the action sets nor the cost functions need to be convex. For an important class of sum-aggregative games, which includes congestion games with equal to 1, a gradient-proximal algorithm is used to construct -Nash equilibria with at most iterations. These results are applied to a numerical example concerning the demand-side management of an electricity system. The asymptotic performance of the algorithm when tends to infinity is illustrated.
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