New method of verifying cryptographic protocols based on the process model
A. M. Mironov

TL;DR
This paper introduces a new mathematical process model for cryptographic protocols, enabling formal verification of their correctness and security to prevent errors that could cause significant damage.
Contribution
The paper presents a novel process-based mathematical model for cryptographic protocols, facilitating their verification and ensuring security properties.
Findings
Model effectively describes cryptographic protocols and their properties
Enables formal verification of protocol correctness and security
Addresses critical errors that can lead to financial and social damage
Abstract
A cryptographic protocol (CP) is a distributed algorithm designed to provide a secure communication in an insecure environment. CPs are used, for example, in electronic payments, electronic voting procedures, database access systems, etc. Errors in the CPs can lead to great financial and social damage, therefore it is necessary to use mathematical methods to justify the correctness and safety of the CPs. In this paper, a new mathematical model of a CP is introduced, which allows one to describe both the CPs and their properties. It is shown how, on the base of this model, it is possible to solve the problems of verification of CPs.
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdvanced Authentication Protocols Security · User Authentication and Security Systems · Cryptographic Implementations and Security
