Electt: running auditable and verifiable elections in untrusted environments
Kirill A. Korinsky

TL;DR
Electt is a system designed for secure, auditable, and verifiable elections in untrusted environments, utilizing blockchain, threshold encryption, and onion-routing to ensure voter anonymity, election integrity, and scalability.
Contribution
It introduces a novel election system combining blockchain logs, threshold encryption, and onion-routing to enable secure, transparent, and scalable voting in untrusted settings.
Findings
Votes remain anonymous despite random candidate ordering.
The system enables voters to verify their votes.
Election results are protected until official disclosure.
Abstract
We present a system for running auditable and verifiable elections in untrusted environments. Votes are anonymous since the order of candidates on a ballot sheet is random. Tellers see only the position of the candidate. Voters can check their vote. An election is auditable using blockchain log. Threshold-encryption, which is used to implement the quorum, prevents a deadlock from occurring if a minority of candidates or observers tries to sabotage the election. Candidates and observers can indicate that the election was free and fair by exposing their keys, which are used by the system to decrypt each vote. Ballot sheets are encrypted by onion-routing, which has a layer with the key of the election instance, so it's impossible for a quorum to decode the results before they have announced their decision by exposing their keys. A register of voters ensures that only verified voters can…
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Taxonomy
TopicsInternet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting · Cryptography and Data Security · Security and Verification in Computing
