Continuous Blackjack: Equilibrium, Deviation and Adaptive Strategy
Mu Zhao

TL;DR
This paper introduces continuous blackjack, analyzing its Nash equilibrium, deviations, adaptive strategies, and applying reinforcement learning to develop practical, model-free strategies for the game.
Contribution
It presents a comprehensive study of continuous blackjack, including equilibrium analysis, deviation behavior, adaptive strategies, and reinforcement learning applications.
Findings
Nash equilibrium characterized for continuous blackjack
Deviations from equilibrium analyzed and modeled
Reinforcement learning yields effective model-free strategies
Abstract
We introduce a variant of the classic poker game blackjack -- the continuous blackjack. We study the Nash Equilibrium as well as the case where players deviate from it. We then pivot to the study of a large class of adaptive strategies and obtain a model-free strategy. Finally, we apply reinforcement learning techniques to the game and address several associated engineering challenges.
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Taxonomy
TopicsArtificial Intelligence in Games · Reinforcement Learning in Robotics · Sports Analytics and Performance
