Leaky Buddies: Cross-Component Covert Channels on Integrated CPU-GPU Systems
Sankha Baran Dutta, Hoda Naghibijouybari, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh, Andres, Marquez, and Kevin Barker

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates novel covert channel attacks between integrated CPU and GPU components, exploiting shared microarchitectural resources to reveal potential security vulnerabilities in modern heterogeneous systems.
Contribution
The paper introduces the first known cross-component covert channels between CPU and GPU on integrated systems, highlighting new security risks and attack techniques.
Findings
Achieved 120 kbps bandwidth with 2% error rate via LLC cache channel.
Achieved 400 kbps bandwidth with 0.8% error rate via contention channel.
Showed feasibility of cross-component microarchitectural covert channels in integrated CPU-GPU systems.
Abstract
Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) are a ubiquitous component across the range of today's computing platforms, from phones and tablets, through personal computers, to high-end server class platforms. With the increasing importance of graphics and video workloads, recent processors are shipped with GPU devices that are integrated on the same chip. Integrated GPUs share some resources with the CPU and as a result, there is a potential for microarchitectural attacks from the GPU to the CPU or vice versa. We believe this type of attack, crossing the component boundary (GPU to CPU or vice versa) is novel, introducing unique challenges, but also providing the attacker with new capabilities that must be considered when we design defenses against microarchitectrual attacks in these environments. Specifically, we consider the potential for covert channel attacks that arise either from shared…
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