An Iterative Mechanism for Coupling Electricity Markets
Alfredo Garcia, Roohallah Khatami, Ceyhun Eksin, Furkan Sezer

TL;DR
This paper introduces a scalable iterative mechanism for coupling independent electricity markets, ensuring efficient energy trade and preserving internal market incentives through incentive transfers, with proven convergence and tested on a standard system.
Contribution
It proposes a novel decentralized iterative mechanism for electricity market coupling that maintains incentive compatibility and converges to optimal flows.
Findings
Mechanism converges to optimal inter-market flows.
Incentive structure preserves internal market equilibrium.
Simulation on IEEE system demonstrates efficiency.
Abstract
The coordinated operation of interconnected but locally controlled electricity markets is generally referred to as a "coupling". In this paper we propose a new mechanism design for efficient coupling of independent electricity markets. The mechanism operates after each individual market has settled (e.g. hour-ahead) and based upon the reported supply and demand functions for internal market optimization (clearing), each market operator is asked to iteratively quote the terms of energy trade (on behalf of the agents participating in its market) across the transmission lines connecting to other markets. The mechanism is scalable as the informational demands placed on each market operator at each iteration are limited. We show that the mechanism's outcome converges to the optimal flows between markets given the reported supply and demand functions from each individual market clearing. We…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsElectric Power System Optimization · Smart Grid Energy Management · Optimal Power Flow Distribution
