How Intellectual Communities Progress

TL;DR

This paper proposes a new framework for understanding intellectual progress by focusing on community epistemic states and the inquiry process, rather than solely on individual knowledge acquisition.

Contribution

It introduces a community-relative view of progress and emphasizes the importance of inquiry processes over static epistemic states.

Findings

Progress is better evaluated through inquiry processes rather than knowledge states.

Focus on community epistemic positions enhances understanding of intellectual advancement.

The framework supports nuanced views of philosophical progress, including optimism and pessimism.

Abstract

Recent work takes both philosophical and scientific progress to consist in acquiring factive epistemic states such as knowledge. However, much of this work leaves unclear what entity is the subject of these epistemic states. Furthermore, by focusing only on states like knowledge, we overlook progress in intermediate cases between ignorance and knowledge -- for example, many now celebrated theories were initially so controversial that they were not known. This paper develops an improved framework for thinking about intellectual progress. Firstly, I argue that we should think of progress relative to the epistemic position of an intellectual community rather than individual inquirers. Secondly, I show how focusing on the extended process of inquiry (rather than the mere presence or absence of states like knowledge) provides a better evaluation of different types of progress. This includes progress through formulating worthwhile questions, acquiring new evidence, and increasing credence on the right answers to these questions. I close by considering the ramifications for philosophical progress, suggesting that my account supports rejecting the most negative views while allowing us to articulate different varieties of optimism and pessimism.