A Reputation for Honesty
Drew Fudenberg, Ying Gao, Harry Pei

TL;DR
This paper examines how players can build reputations for honesty in strategic settings, showing that honesty can be a valuable asset under certain uncertainties, with implications for long-term reputation management.
Contribution
It introduces a model where reputation for honesty, rather than specific actions, influences outcomes, highlighting conditions under which honesty yields high payoffs.
Findings
Honesty reputation can lead to high payoffs under uncertainty.
Reputation benefits diminish when uncertainty about feasible actions is absent.
The model clarifies when honesty is a strategic advantage.
Abstract
We analyze situations in which players build reputations for honesty rather than for playing particular actions. A patient player facing a sequence of short-run opponents makes an announcement about their intended action after observing an idiosyncratic shock, and before players act. The patient player is either an honest type whose action coincides with their announcement, or an opportunistic type who can freely choose their actions. We show that the patient player can secure a high payoff by building a reputation for being honest when the short-run players face uncertainty about which of the patient player's actions are currently feasible, but may receive a low payoff when there is no such uncertainty.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
