Power Injection Attacks in Smart Distribution Grids with Photovoltaics

TL;DR

This paper analyzes the worst-case power injection attack strategies on smart distribution grids with photovoltaics, identifying critical attack points and signals, and discusses potential defense mechanisms.

Contribution

It introduces a method to determine the worst attack signals and locations in photovoltaic-rich distribution grids, enhancing understanding of vulnerabilities and defense strategies.

Findings

Worst attack signal is a sign-switching step function

Worst attack location is the node with the largest impedance

Numerical examples verify theoretical results

Abstract

In order to protect smart distribution grids from intrusions, it is important to understand possible risks and impacts of attacks. We study the worst-case attack strategy of a power injection attack against the physical layer of a smart distribution grid with a high penetration of photovoltaic resources. We derive both the worst attack signal and worst attack location: The worst attack signal is a step function which switches its sign at the final stage, and the worst attack location is the node with the largest impedance to the grid substation. Numerical examples on a European benchmark model verify the developed results. Finally, both theoretical and numerical results are used to discuss feasible defense strategies against power injection attacks.