Modelling aspects of consciousness: a topological perspective

TL;DR

This paper uses topological modeling to support Attention Schema Theory by demonstrating that a complete representation of attention is impossible, explaining why subjective awareness remains inherently incomplete.

Contribution

It provides a mathematical topological proof that a complete self-representation of attention cannot be achieved, supporting the core idea of AST.

Findings

Complete attention representation is mathematically impossible.

The model supports the idea of inherent incompleteness in consciousness.

Reinforces the importance of the attention schema in understanding consciousness.

Abstract

Attention Schema Theory (AST) is a recent proposal to provide a scientific explanation for the basis of subjective awareness. In AST, the brain constructs a representation of attention taking place in its own (and others') mind (`the attention schema'). Moreover, this representation is incomplete for efficiency reasons. This inherent incompleteness of the attention schema results in the inability of humans to understand how their own subjective awareness arises (related to the so-called `hard problem' of consciousness). Given this theory, the present paper asks whether a mind (either human or machine-based) that incorporates attention, and that contains a representation of its own attention, can ever have a complete representation. Using a simple yet general model and a mathematical argument based on classical topology, we show that a complete representation of attention is not possible, since it cannot faithfully represent streams of attention. In this way, the study supports one of the core aspects of AST, that the brain's representation of its own attention is necessarily incomplete.