Modelling aspects of consciousness: a topological perspective
Mike Steel

TL;DR
This paper uses topological modeling to support Attention Schema Theory by demonstrating that a complete representation of attention is impossible, explaining why subjective awareness remains inherently incomplete.
Contribution
It provides a mathematical topological proof that a complete self-representation of attention cannot be achieved, supporting the core idea of AST.
Findings
Complete attention representation is mathematically impossible.
The model supports the idea of inherent incompleteness in consciousness.
Reinforces the importance of the attention schema in understanding consciousness.
Abstract
Attention Schema Theory (AST) is a recent proposal to provide a scientific explanation for the basis of subjective awareness. In AST, the brain constructs a representation of attention taking place in its own (and others') mind (`the attention schema'). Moreover, this representation is incomplete for efficiency reasons. This inherent incompleteness of the attention schema results in the inability of humans to understand how their own subjective awareness arises (related to the so-called `hard problem' of consciousness). Given this theory, the present paper asks whether a mind (either human or machine-based) that incorporates attention, and that contains a representation of its own attention, can ever have a complete representation. Using a simple yet general model and a mathematical argument based on classical topology, we show that a complete representation of attention is not…
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Taxonomy
TopicsNeural dynamics and brain function · Neuroscience and Neural Engineering · EEG and Brain-Computer Interfaces
