Hedonic Expertise Games
Bugra Caskurlu, Fatih Erdem Kizilkaya, Berkehan Ozen

TL;DR
This paper models team formation with expertise considerations as hedonic games, demonstrating existence and computational properties of stable and optimal partitions, and extends results to a broader class of monotone submodular hedonic games.
Contribution
It introduces a novel hedonic game model for expertise-based team formation and proves existence, stability, and approximation results, extending to a larger class of monotone submodular hedonic games.
Findings
Existence of Nash stable, core stable, and Pareto optimal partitions.
Polynomial-time algorithms for certain stable partitions.
Approximation of core stability within a factor of 1 - 1/e.
Abstract
We consider a team formation setting where agents have varying levels of expertise in a global set of required skills, and teams are ranked with respect to how well the expertise of teammates complement each other. We model this setting as a hedonic game, and we show that this class of games possesses many desirable properties, some of which are as follows: A partition that is Nash stable, core stable and Pareto optimal is always guaranteed to exist. A contractually individually stable partition (and a Nash stable partition in a restricted setting) can be found in polynomial-time. A core stable partition can be approximated within a factor of , and this bound is tight unless . We also introduce a larger and relatively general class of games, which we refer to as monotone submodular hedonic games with common ranking property. We show that the above…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Auction Theory and Applications · Economic theories and models
