EC-SVC: Secure CAN Bus In-Vehicle Communications with Fine-grained Access Control Based on Edge Computing

TL;DR

This paper proposes EC-SVC, a security protocol for in-vehicle CAN bus communications that leverages edge computing and attribute-based encryption to enhance message confidentiality and address resource constraints.

Contribution

It introduces a reconfigured cryptographic scheme and security protocol utilizing edge computing and attribute-based access control for secure vehicle communications.

Findings

The protocol effectively protects messages from attackers.

The cryptographic scheme is formally proven secure.

Feasibility is demonstrated via CANoe software simulations.

Abstract

In-vehicle communications are not designed for message exchange between the vehicles and outside systems originally. Thus, the security design of message protection is insufficient. Moreover, the internal devices do not have enough resources to process the additional security operations. Nonetheless, due to the characteristic of the in-vehicle network in which messages are broadcast, secure message transmission to specific receivers must be ensured. With consideration of the facts aforementioned, this work addresses resource problems by offloading secure operations to high-performance devices, and uses attribute-based access control to ensure the confidentiality of messages from attackers and unauthorized users. In addition, we reconfigure existing access control based cryptography to address new vulnerabilities arising from the use of edge computing and attribute-based access control. Thus, this paper proposes an edge computing-based security protocol with fine-grained attribute-based encryption using a hash function, symmetric-based cryptography, and reconfigured cryptographic scheme. In addition, this work formally proves the reconfigured cryptographic scheme and security protocol, and evaluates the feasibility of the proposed security protocol in various aspects using the CANoe software.