Secure Your Intention: On Notions of Pre-Opacity in Discrete-Event Systems
Shuo Yang, Xiang Yin

TL;DR
This paper introduces the concept of pre-opacity in discrete-event systems, focusing on predicting future secret intentions, and provides verification algorithms and complexity analysis for this new security property.
Contribution
It proposes a novel notion of pre-opacity to analyze future secret intentions, along with necessary conditions, verification methods, and complexity results.
Findings
Pre-opacity can be characterized by necessary and sufficient conditions.
Verification of pre-opacity is PSPACE-hard.
The framework extends to secret intentions as event sequences.
Abstract
This paper investigates an important informationflow security property called opacity in partially-observed discrete-event systems. We consider the presence of a passive intruder (eavesdropper) that knows the dynamic model of the system and can use the generated information-flow to infer some "secret" of the system. A system is said to be opaque if it always holds the plausible deniability for its secret. Existing notions of opacity only consider secret either as currently visiting some secret states or as having visited some secret states in the past. In this paper, we investigate information-flow security from a new angle by considering the secret of the system as the intention to execute some particular behavior of importance in the future. To this end, we propose a new class of opacity called pre-opacity that characterizes whether or not the intruder can predict the visit of secret…
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Taxonomy
TopicsSecurity and Verification in Computing · Petri Nets in System Modeling · Distributed systems and fault tolerance
