Point-to-Point Strategic Communication

TL;DR

This paper introduces a strategic framework for joint source-channel coding where encoder and decoder have different goals, analyzing four scenarios including cooperation, Stackelberg leadership, commitment, and Nash equilibrium.

Contribution

It provides a unified strategic formulation for source-channel coding with distinct distortion functions across four different game-theoretic scenarios.

Findings

Solutions for cooperative encoding and decoding strategies.

Analysis of Stackelberg leader-follower dynamics.

Characterization of Nash equilibrium in cheap talk settings.

Abstract

We propose a strategic formulation for the joint source-channel coding problem in which the encoder and the decoder are endowed with distinct distortion functions. We provide the solutions in four different scenarios. First, we assume that the encoder and the decoder cooperate in order to achieve a certain pair of distortion values. Second, we suppose that the encoder commits to a strategy whereas the decoder implements a best response, as in the persuasion game where the encoder is the Stackelberg leader. Third, we consider that the decoder commits to a strategy, as in the mismatched rate-distortion problem or as in the mechanism design framework. Fourth, we investigate the cheap talk game in which the encoding and the decoding strategies form a Nash equilibrium.