Getting Passive Aggressive About False Positives: Patching Deployed Malware Detectors
Edward Raff, Bobby Filar, James Holt

TL;DR
This paper introduces a passive-aggressive learning approach to adapt deployed malware detectors to individual environments, significantly reducing false positives without retraining the entire model or sharing sensitive data.
Contribution
It presents a novel application of passive-aggressive learning to fix false positives in deployed malware detection systems, improving accuracy locally.
Findings
Reduced false positive alerts by an average of 23x
Effective adaptation without compromising overall model accuracy
Eliminated need for extensive retraining or allowlist techniques
Abstract
False positives (FPs) have been an issue of extreme importance for anti-virus (AV) systems for decades. As more security vendors turn to machine learning, alert deluge has hit critical mass with over 20% of all alerts resulting in FPs and, in some organizations, the number reaches half of all alerts. This increase has resulted in fatigue, frustration, and, worst of all, neglect from security workers on SOC teams. A foundational cause for FPs is that vendors must build one global system to try and satisfy all customers, but have no method to adjust to individual local environments. This leads to outrageous, albeit technically correct, characterization of their platforms being 99.9% effective. Once these systems are deployed the idiosyncrasies of individual, local environments expose blind spots that lead to FPs and uncertainty. We propose a strategy for fixing false positives in…
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